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s 
would be adjacent to Primrose Street and Huntsman 
the Swaffords' lot and Primrose Street. 
built a physical between 
This alleged breach occurred no later than August 2008. The Swaffords' filed their 
Complaint in July 2015-seven years after the alleged breach. 
The trial court dismissed the Swaffords' untimely Complaint because the breach of 
contract occurred in 2008 and the language of the Complaint itself showed the Swaffords 
knew or could have known of the breach of contract in 2008. There are no genuine issues of 
material fact that the pertinent statutes of limitations bar the Swaffords' Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Swaffords considered lack of access to their lot from Primrose Street as a 
breach of contract. 
The Swaffords claimed that Huntsman Springs breached a contract when Huntsman 
Springs restricted access to the Swaffords' lot from Primrose Street. In a letter dated August 
2014, and attached to the Swaffords' Complaint, Ron Swafford wrote that Huntsman 
allegedly as 
In August 14 Ron Swafford considered of access to his lot Primrose 
Street a breach of contract. Huntsman built dividing 2008 
access to the Swaffords' lot in 2008. Huntsman Springs changed the ingress and egress from 
the Swaffords' lot in 2008. 
The Swaffords' Complaint alleges that Huntsman Springs breached its contract by 
restricting access from Primrose Street: 
• Huntsman Springs allegedly represented on marketing materials that the Swaffords' 
lot would be "directly adjacent to Primrose Street."2 
• Huntsman Springs allegedly failed to provide the Swaffords' lot with "ingress and 
egress from Primrose Street. "3 
• Huntsman Springs allegedly breached its contract by "visually partitioning" the 
Swaffords' lot from the remainder of Huntsman Springs. 4 
• Huntsman Springs allegedly breached its express warranties to the Swaffords by 
failing to access to their lot from Primrose Street. 5 
• Huntsman Springs failed to provide "access to lot 50 from Primrose Street, through a 
park on the west boundary."6 
• Huntsman Springs failed to place "entrance access to the lot from Primrose 
• Huntsman Springs misrepresented that "commercial ingress and egress would be 
from Primrose Street as ingress or could not reasonably placed across a 
family walk and bike path."8 
and dealing it 
a barrier the remainder Huntsman Springs and the 
commercial lots, and Huntsman Springs "segregated" the Swaffords' lot from the 
rest of the development. 10 
• "The Master Plan represented that access to and from 195 Primrose Street. Further, it 
would not be reasonable nor feasible to place commercial access and ingress across 
family walk ways and bike paths. I I 
Central to the Swaffords' breach of contract claims is their lot's lack of access to Primrose 
Street. They claim that Huntsman Springs failed to follow the Master Plat and effectively 
partitioned the lot from the rest of the development. 
2. Access to the Swaffords' lot from Primrose Street was obstructed no later than 
August 2008. 
There are no genuine issues of material fact that the Swaffords' lot was segregated 
from Primrose Street by August 2008. The Swaffords had actual or constructive knowledge 
of the following facts: 
• July 20, 2007-The Swaffords' plat was recorded in Teton County showing a park 
separating the Swaffords' lot from Primrose Street. 12 
• September 21, 2007-The Swaffords closed on their property and received a 
warranty deed and title insurance policy that showed a park separating their property 
from Primrose Street. 13 
e August 2008-Huntsman the bike 
on the west side of the Swaffords' lot. 16 
e August 13, 2008-"[T]he landscaping, walking paths, anJ trees aJjacent to 
and the west of Lot 4 of Block 50, also identified on the recorded plat as Park 3, 
were completed on or before August 13, 2008." 17 
Huntsman Springs submitted facts in the form of the Affidavit of Todd 
Woolstenhulme, the construction manager for Huntsman Springs and the individual who 
oversaw all aspects of the installation, completion, and approval of the Huntsman Springs 
infrastructure. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the 
same standard as does the trial court. Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257,259,245 P.3d 1009, 
1011 (2011 ). Specifically, summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, 
admissions and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing I.R.C.P. 
56( c) ). The principle and purpose of a summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of 
factually unsupportable claims. Sparks v. Lukes Regional 1\;fedical , 115 
505, 768 P.2d 768 (1988). "If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of 
The statute of limitations began to nm no later than August 2008 when the 
alleged breach of contract "accrued." 
Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Swaffords' Complaint are all founded on breach of a 
written contract: Count I Breach of Contract; Count II Breach of Express Warranty; Count 
III Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. In Idaho, "[a]n action upon any contract, 
obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" must be commenced within 
five years. J.C. § 5-216. The statute of limitations does not begin to run "until the cause of 
action accrues," or in other words, a claim "accrues upon the breach of the contract." Spence 
v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 770, 890 P .2d 714, 721 ( 1995). The Idaho Court of Appeals put it 
another way in Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 91 915, 655 P.2d 119, 1 
(Ct.App.1982): "The cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, 
when a party may sue another." 
According to the Complaint, Huntsman Springs, Inc. misrepresented to the 
Swaffords the nature of the Swaffords' lot relative to the rest of the subdivision: their lot 
was not "adjacent" to Primrose Street, bike paths and landscaping interfered with ingress 
and to the trees and landscaping a lot 
statute limitations a contract case to run from alleged 
"breach," not when the plaintiff gives the defendant notice and an opportunity to 
repair. Idaho does have the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act for construction cases. 
I.C. §§ 6-2501-2504. This is not a construction case. Even if this framework applied here, it 
is unclear how any "notice and opportunity to repair'' restarts a statute of limitations. The 
concept of giving opportunity to repair prior to filing a lawsuit is intended to prevent 
unnecessary lawsuits; notice and opportunity to repair does not provide plaintiffs additional 
time to file the lawsuit. In this case, it is uncontested that the alleged breaches occurred in 
2007 and 2008. 
The Swaffords argue that they "were not fully aware of their damages" until they 
corresponded via letter with Huntsman Springs in 2014. Uncertainty about damages is not a 
basis for tolling or restarting the statute of limitations. "A cause of action for breach of 
contract accrues upon the breach even though no damage may occur until later. Mason v. 
Tucker & Associates, 1 Idaho 429, 436, 871 P.2d 846, 853 (Ct App. 1994) (citation 
omitted). In this case, the alleged damages occurred in 2007 and 2008 and they were 
observable to Swaffords. 
a failed to 
access to the lot Huntsman Springs misrepresented 
that "commercial ingress and egress would be from Primrose Street as ingress or egress 
could not reasonably be placed across a family walk and bike path";22 Huntsman Springs 
breached the contract because "access to and from the commercial lots would be from 
Primrose Street, due to the family walk way and bike path being on the east side of Lot 
50. In short, the Swaffords' central allegation is that Huntsman Springs breached the 
contract when it failed to make their lot accessible from Primrose Street. 
Three months after the final plat was recorded, in October 2007, Primrose Street was 
prepped and paved. 24 If the Swaffords were unaware of the alleged breach of contract in 
July 2007 when the plat was recorded, surely they were aware of the alleged breach in 
October 2007 when Primrose Street was paved and their property was separated from it by a 
strip of land. In October 2007 Mr. Swafford could have written as he did in August 2014, 
that a "dividing partition" separated his lot from Primrose Street, and "[t]he development 
has changed the address, ingress and egress, as the lot has absolutely no access from 
Primrose."25 In October 2007 the Swaffords' breach of contract claims "accrued" because 
In August 2008, the Swaffords could have stood on their and observed that family 
walk way and bike path blocked access to their lot in the manner they now allege in the 
Complaint. In August 2008, the Swaffords could have observed from their property that a 
paved Primrose Street was not adjacent to their lot. 
The Swaffords' breach of contract claim also claims that Huntsman Springs breached 
the contract by its placement of landscaping between the Swaffords' lot and Primrose Street. 
"Defendant segregated and partitioned the commercial lot from the east side of Huntsman 
Springs with trees and a ditch not represented in the plan."26 The landscaping was 
completed by August 13, 2008. 
Todd Woolstenhulme, the construction manager who oversaw the construction of the 
infrastructure of Huntsman Springs Subdivision stated by affidavit, 
the landscaping, walking path, and trees directly adjacent to and the west of 
Lot 4 of Block 50, also identified on the recorded plat as Park 3, were 
completed on or before August 13, 2008. Plaintiff would have had visual 
knowledge that the actual construction of the bike path and park landscaping 
did not match their expectations, as included in their Complaint, on or before 
August 13, 2008. 27 
contract not 
July 2007, and if the claims had not accrued October 2007 Primrose 
8. 
and to 
installing a bike path and family walkway on the west side of their lot rather than on the 
east side of their lot. According to the Swaffords' Complaint, "The Master Plan represented 
that access to and from 195 Primrose Street. Further, it would not be reasonable nor feasible 
to place commercial access and ingress across family walk ways and bike paths."28 The 
Swaffords could have literally written this exact statement in August 2008-they could have 
filed this breach of contract allegation seven years ago. 
Additionally, the construction of the walkways and paths in August 2008 constituted 
the alleged breach because the bike paths and family walk ways were not in the place the 
Swaffords had anticipated-the path and walkway was installed on the west side of the 
Swaffords' lot rather than the east side of the Swaffords' lot. 29 Again, this language from 
the Complaint could have been written in August 2008: "Defendant has breached the 
contract ... by failing to install a family walk way and bike path as identified on the Master 
Plan. "30 That alleged breach happened when the walkways and pathways were installed, in 
August 2008. 
There is no genuine issue of material fact that the Swaffords knew or could have 
the contract 2008 own lot. 
on was not to 
place their lot adjacent to Primrose Street. The Plat" that Huntsman Springs recorded 
Teton County on July 20, 2017 clearly shows that a . 76 acre park, Park the 
Swaffords' lot from Primrose Street. The Swaffords attached this recorded plat to their 
Complaint as Attachment "E." 
Not only did the Final Plat explicitly show the alleged breaches the Swaffords now 
assert, the Swaffords received a warranty deed and title insurance policy when they closed 
on the property in September 2007. 32 
This Court has ruled that the statute of limitations begins running based on what the 
plaintiffs could have known of the breach, not when the actually knew of the breach. Chapin 
v. Stewart, 71 Idaho 306,310,230 P.2d 998, 1001 (1951). If the recording of the Final Plat 
was insufficient to give the Swaffords constructive knowledge of the alleged contract 
breaches, then the warranty deed and title insurance policy they received at closing would 
have been sufficient. 
In Chappin, the Idaho Supreme Court found that a deed recorded in Ada County was 
sufficient to begin the running of the statute of limitations. The Court reasoned, 
While it is stipulated that the appellants did not know of their interest those lots 
until about a year before this suit was brought, that makes no difference, for they 
had the means of acquiring that knowledge, as the deed conveying the title to said 
lots to their father was of record during all that time in the office of the county 
recorder of Ada county, said lots were situated. means of acquiring 
this knowledge was open to them, and, facts of this case, that places 
the same position as 
at 311, at 1001. 
In this case, Huntington Springs the "Final recorded 
document contains the alleged breach of contract complained of the Swaffords' 
Complaint-it clearly shows that a park prevents the Swaffords' lot from being adjacent to 
Primrose Street. The Swaffords also received notice at closing in September 2007 when they 
received their warranty deed and title insurance policy. If they did not know that there lot 
was not adjacent to Primrose Street in 2007, it was because by their "own carelessness or 
negligence they failed to acquire knowledge that was within their reach." Id 
In Chapin, the knowledge necessary to begin the running of the statute of limitations 
was filed away in an Ada County office building. That was sufficient "knowledge" to begin 
the running of the statute of limitations. In this case, the Swaffords could have known-and 
almost certainly did know-of the alleged breaches in 2008 because those alleged breaches 
were visually observable on their own property. 
The following table compares the Swaffords' own allegations in their Complaint 
compared to what they knew or could have known in 2007 and 2008 when their claims 
accrued: 
Huntsman Springs represented that it 
would build the bike path and family walk 
on the east side of the Swaffords' lot, but 
instead the path and walk were built on the 
west side of the Swaffords' lot. 37 
Huntsman Springs allegedly blocked 
ingress and egress to the Swaffords' lot 
from Primrose Street by constructing the 
bike path and landscaping on the west 
side, in "Park 3."39 
The Swaffords allege that Huntsman 
Springs "intentionally created a barrier 
between the remainder of Huntsman 
Springs and the commercial lots."40 
33 Complaint, ,r 6, R. 
September 2007-The closed on 
property and received a warranty deed and title 
insurance policy with exemptions referencing the final 
plat, which showed a park separating their property from 
Primrose Street. 35 
October 31, 2007-Primrose Street was prepped or 
paved consistent with the recorded plat; the park 
separated the Swaffords' property from Primrose 
Street.36 
August 13, 2008-Huntsman Springs completed the bike 
path and family walkway on the west side of the 
Swaffords' lot. 38 
August 13, 2008-Huntsman Springs completed the bike 
path and family walkway on the west side of the 
Swaffords' lot. 
August 13, 2008-"[T]he landscaping, walking paths, 
and trees directly adjacent to and the west of Lot 4 of 
Block 50, also identified on the recorded plat as Park 3, 
were completed on or before August 13, 2008. "41 
34 Complaint, Exhibit E, R. p.46; Affidavit of Todd Woolstenhulme, ,r 6, R. p.87. 
35 Affidavit of Todd Woolstenhulme, ,r 6, R. p.87 
36 Affidavit of Todd Woolstenhulme, ,i7, R. pp.87-88. 
37 Complaint, n 31, 32, R. pp. 6-7. 
38 Affidavit of Todd Woolstenhulme, ,r 7, R. pp.87-88. 
39 According to the Swaffords' Complaint, Huntsman Springs represented that "commercial ingress and 
egress would be from Primrose Street as ingress or egress could not reasonably be placed across a family 
walk way and bike path," and "access to and from the commercial lots would be from Primrose Street, due to 
the family walk way and bike path being on the east side of Lot 50." Complaint, ,r,r 13, 31, 32, R. pp.6-7. 
4° Complaint, ,r,r 13, 37, R. p.4. 
41 Affidavit of Todd Woolstenhulme, ,r 8, R. p.88. 
13 
to 
Swaffords sent a 
contract 
to Huntsman Springs in August 
no 
attached the to 
Comolaint thev later filed" ~ .,I - - , the Swaffords that believed 
Huntsman Springs breached their contract when they separated the Swaffords' lot from 
Primrose Street. This is the language from the Swaffords' letter: 
Huntsman Springs has seriously neglected the development of these lots, and 
has seriously damaged their value and marketability by building a dividing 
partition consisting of a tree line and a roadway on the Huntsman Springs 
side, which now separates my lot from Huntsman Springs. The development 
has changed the address, ingress and egress, as the lot has absolutely no 
access from Primrose. 
You have effectively changed the address, as well as the access to my lot 
from the Primrose paved roadway to a gravel road appearing outside of 
Huntsman Springs. 42 
The trial court reasoned that this letter served as acknowledgment by the Swaffords that the 
breach of contract occurred many years prior. These are the words of the trial court: 
Swaffords contend that the statute of limitations only accrued when they 
received a letter dated September 3, 2014, informing them that Huntsman 
Springs did not intend to allow access to their lot from Primrose Street. 
However, the facts show that Huntsman Springs sent the letter in response to 
a letter sent by Swaffords on August 20, 2014, already alleging a breach of 
contract. By suggesting in their letter that they would sue if they did not 
receive a response, Swaffords have essentially conceded to knowing that an 
alleged breach of contract had already occurred.43 
42 Complaint, Attachment F, R. pp.47-49. 
41 Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p.5, R. p.341. 
14 
cause § 
619. Idaho, cause action accrues when one party sue another. See 
Singleton v. Pichon, 635 P .2d (Idaho l 1 ); Galbraith v. 
122-23 (Idaho Ct.App.1982). 
The Swaffords' Complaint alleges that Huntsman Springs violated the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act in the following ways: "Defendant's marketing and sales conduct for the sale of 
the undeveloped lots in Teton County as they relate to Plaintiffs consists of unfair and deceptive 
practices of conduct in trade or commerce."44 "The conduct of Defendant through its agents and 
representatives was deceptive in that Defendant provided the Master Plan, recorded plat, website 
and promotional materials outlining future developments of undeveloped lots, with no intention 
of compliance. "45 While the Complaint gives no specifics, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
Swaffords allege that Huntsman Springs' marketing materials violated LC. § 48-603. 
The marketing materials were provided to the Swaffords in May 2007. As argued above, 
all of the defects alleged by the Swaffords had come to fruition by August 2008. By August 2008 
the S waffords could stand on their property with the marketing materials in hand and could 
observe that the property was not as they had anticipated. Again, Huntsman Springs does not 
it not that it Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. All Huntsman Springs is misrepresentations 
cause a 
Swaffords' fifth cause 1S Springs was 
unable to find a cause of action in Idaho for misrepresentation, so it assumes that this is a 
claim of "fraud." In Idaho, a cause of action for fraud is "not to be deemed to have accrued 
until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." 
Idaho Code Ann.§ 5-218(4). 
"Defendant provided extensive promotional material, a website, brochures and a 
Master Plan to Plaintiffs to influence the purchase of undeveloped real property in 
Huntsman Springs Phase I. "46 "The representations were false. " 47 
Again, as stated above, the marketing materials were provided in May 2007. By 
August 2008 the Swaffords had discovered or could have discovered the facts constituting 
the alleged fraud. The three year statute of limitations, Idaho Code § 18( 4 ), has long 
since run. 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
moves the an of and costs on 
a 
case, 1s contract a lot." 
Swaffords refer to the lot at issue throughout his Complaint as a "commercial " 
end of the Complaint, the Swaffords petition the Court for attorney's fees pursuant to 
Section 12-120(3). 
the 
The Idaho Supreme Court has granted attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
120(3) when a party prevailed at summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. 
Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A , 154 Idaho 21, 27, 293 P .3d 645, 651 
(2013). If the Court rules in Huntsman Springs' favor, Huntsman Springs moves the Court 
for an award of attorney's fees and costs. 
Huntsman Springs is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 
1 121. As stated above, Huntsman Springs is the "prevailing party. Rule 54( e )(1) states, 
"attorney fees under section l 121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it 
finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." The trial court ruled that the Swaffords' 
Complaint was three years too late.48 Additionally, the trial court concluded that the 
Swaffords' letter, "essentially conceded to knowing that an alleged breach of contract had 
alreadv occurred."49 The Swaffords lacked anv basis in law or fact to file their untimelv 
. . .; 
moves an of costs to 


